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INTRODUCTION 
 
It does not require the matters with which it deals to be resolved with 
mathematical accuracy. The essential question is whether the alleged 
inequality of arms is such as to deprive the accused of his right to a fair 
trial. 
       Lord Hope of Craighead1  
 
This paper addresses some of the problems and possibilities concerning the 
fairness of our current arrangements around fitness to plead.  Fitness to plead 
refers to those procedures which determine whether or not an accused person 
should be subject to a criminal trial when their ability to enter a plea (and 
thereafter, if necessary, take part in a trial) is compromised because they are not of 
‘sound mind’.2  Subjecting such individuals to plea and trial entails two risks. First, 
of wrongful convictions, in that an accused may not have committed the offence, 
and yet he or she cannot properly defend him or herself. And second, of 
undermining confidence in the law: if the law is seen to impose its full rigour on 
those who cannot fairly participate in their own trials, albeit they may have 
committed the offence charged, public support for the law will be jeopardised.    
Paradoxically, there are equally strong arguments in favour of ensuring that all 
those who can properly be tried, should be so tried.  To deny those whose 
capacities are limited in some way from the benefits of timely trials is potentially 
discriminatory; if, with the requisite support, a trial can proceed fairly it should.3  
Thus, the problem in this field is one of correctly separating those who should and 
should not be subject to plea and trial, and doing so on an agreed and fair basis. 
This paper, written in the light of the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper 
on Unfitness,4 but before delivery of their final report,5 is designed to examine 
some of the core competencies that should underpin a test of unfitness to plead.  
It comprises three broad sections: (i) an examination of the current problems with 
unfitness and the foundational principles for a revised test, (ii) a description of the 
prevailing test of unfitness and of those that might be used to reformulate it, and 
(iii) an examination of the core competencies that would be required in an accused 
person to facilitate proper engagement with a criminal trial.  There is then an 
Appendix which represents some of the working criteria which emerged during 
the formulation of the psychiatric test currently under development.   
                                                     
1 Referring to the purpose of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the 
Privy Council case of McLean & Anor v Procurator Fiscal (Scotland) [2001] UKPC D3 at [39]. 
2 Lord Bingham R v Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340, 344. 
3 R(C) v Sevenoaks Youth Court [2009] EWHC 3088. 
4 Law Commission, ‘Unfitness to Plead’ (Consultation Paper no. 197, 2010). 
5 This is likely to be delayed because of the Law Commission’s parallel consultation in 2012 on ‘Insanity’ 
(relating to the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under the M’Naghten Rules).  
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Whilst the paper concludes that fairness should be the key underpinning legal 
concept, it argues that in order to achieve legal fairness the accused must be able 
to play a proper part in the adjudicative process.  Central to this is the notion that 
a range of core competencies should be present in the accused or, where these 
may be deficient, that there is an opportunity to supplement them through 
appropriate support or other guidance.  In the absence of either core 
competencies or appropriate support, accused persons should be subject to the 
unfit to plead provisions. 
  
 
 
PROBLEMS WITH PROCEDURE 
 
Determining that someone is unfit to plead entails a potentially awkward 
interaction between medical and legal professionals and between their intersecting 
values.  Not only is the determination of ‘unfitness’ made by the judge on the basis 
of advice from mental health professionals (advice which the judge may reject), 
but the process and disposal options which follow are also contentious. Where 
unfitness is found a hearing will take place – known as the trial of the facts – 
which determines whether the accused ‘did the act or made the omission 
charged’.6  This trial of the facts does not constitute criminal proceedings;7 indeed, 
the responsibility placed on a person appointed by the court to represent an unfit 
person during the trial of the facts is ‘quite different from the responsibility placed 
on an advocate where he or she could take instructions from a client’;8 and the 
best person to do this may not be the person who had represented the accused 
during the determination of unfitness.9   
All of this would imply that a criminal trial, and the plea which is necessarily a 
part of it, is categorically different from the trial of the facts:  a position 
(controversially) adopted by the House of Lords in R v H in its consideration of 
Article 6 of the ECHR.10  Indeed the Law Commission, in analysing the 
implications of the judgment (to the effect that accused persons enjoy lesser 
protections during the trial of the facts than those to which they might otherwise 
be entitled were these proceedings regarded as essentially criminal in nature and 
thus eligible for the full protection of Article 6), drew attention to some of the 
anomalies that lay behind the House of Lords’ narrow approach to the issues in R 
v H.11 In particular, their failure to acknowledge that hospital orders are criminal 
disposals imposed primarily following a criminal conviction.  The Law 
Commission noted the importance of looking at the substance of disposals and 
                                                     
6 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A(2)(b). 
7 R v H and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 1. 
8 R v Norman Court of Appeal, The Times 21 August 2008. 
9 Notably, the advocate for the unfitness determination is remunerated by the Criminal Defence Service, 
and that for the trial of the facts out of central funds. 
10 n 7 above. 
11 n 4 above, ss 6.47-6.48. 
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not just at their appearance as non-punitive: and they supported the view that, in 
their current form, section 4A hearings had a hybrid nature, being simultaneously 
both civil and criminal. 
Integral to this is also the notion that the disposal options are contentious. 
Whilst the judge can direct either an absolute discharge or a supervision order in 
the community for two years, the third disposal option is admission to a 
psychiatric hospital under the equivalent of a hospital order with (or without) 
restrictions attached. And this is the one provision where a court can order a 
psychiatric hospital to accept the admission of a person found ‘unfit’ even though 
clinicians may not be recommending admission.  In all other circumstances 
clinicians have the final say over which individuals are admitted as patients. 
Something of the nature of these dilemmas has been captured in the Court of 
Appeal in the recent case of R v Walls,12 which post-dated publication of the Law 
Commission’s Consultation Paper.  Walls had been tried and convicted of 
offences of sexual assault on a child under 13 and sentenced to a community order 
with a three-year supervision requirement and a requirement that he attend and 
complete the ‘Adapted Sex Offender Treatment Programme’. The appeal 
concerned whether fresh evidence of his low IQ (of between 63-71 – in the 
extremely low-to-borderline range of intelligence) should be admitted to establish 
that he had been unfit to plead at his original trial within the Pritchard criteria, as 
interpreted in the case of Podola13 (the 1836 case of Pritchard being the leading case 
on unfitness).14  In short the issue was whether his low IQ and learning disability 
affected his ability to participate in a criminal trial.  At the appeal two psychiatrists 
gave evidence asserting that Robert Walls would not have been fit to plead, but 
did not make reference to the Pritchard criteria in their formal reports.  The Court 
of Appeal made clear that the duty of the court was to consider whether the 
defendant was unfit to plead according to those criteria in the light of all the 
evidence before it, including the expert psychiatric evidence.  Manifestly, the 
clinical evidence was not to be the final word on the matter. 
Whilst the Court of Appeal rejected the evidence of one of the psychiatrists 
as evidence on which it did not feel it could rely, the evidence of the other 
psychiatrist was considered in the light of the Pritchard criteria, the police 
interviews with the appellant, evidence concerning the trial, and the actions (and 
inactions) of various parties (solicitor, appropriate adult, CPS, the trial judge, and 
the advocate for the Crown). At the time, no one had suggested Walls was unfit, 
or that any intermediary ought to be appointed by the court under its powers.15 In 
a context where the Court of Appeal was also mindful of the serious nature of 
depriving an accused of the significant rights that accrue in a trial (as opposed to 
the ‘trial of the facts’ procedure), was aware of the half-way house of providing in-
                                                     
12 R v Walls [2011] EWCA Crim 443. 
13 Podola (1960) 1 QB 325. 
14 Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 303. 
15 See n 3 above. 
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court assistance to those with learning disability, and was anxious about the limited 
disposal options following a positive finding if the unfit route were adopted – 
limited in the sense of their ability to protect the public or assist the defendant – it 
is perhaps not surprising that they rejected the appeal.  Although there would be 
cases where, on the evidence, unfitness was clear, even where psychiatrists agreed 
that a defendant was unfit, ‘a court would be failing in its duty to both the public 
and a defendant if it did not rigorously examine the evidence and reach its own 
conclusion’.16  In rejecting the appeal it is notable that the Court of Appeal 
observed that the three-year community order to which the original court had 
sentenced Walls was a year longer than that which he could have been given under 
the unfitness route.  This was regarded as beneficial to Walls and as protective of 
the public.  Indeed they argued that had the unfitness route been adopted, the 
choice either between a hospital order and a two-year supervision order would 
have been less satisfactory than the outcome achieved through the sentencing 
process. 
 
A PRINCIPLED APPROACH? 
 
So why might clinicians and lawyers find themselves at odds?  Since both law and 
medicine embrace multiple philosophies, with neither having one agreed defining 
objective, thinking about the relationship between them will throw up some areas 
where the ground between them is shared, and others where it is more 
problematic.  Fitness to plead arguably falls into the latter category. 
It is commonly held that one core concept for medical practitioners is primum 
non nocere: first, do no harm. This is partially embodied in the Hippocratic Oath’s 
exhortation to ‘never do harm’; or in another translation, to keep the sick from 
‘harm and injustice’.  The extent to which doctors would be better doing nothing 
rather than risking causing harm is however debatable, since it is well recognised 
that in some circumstances primum succurrere – first, hasten to help –  may be more 
appropriate (and more intuitively welcome to those who define themselves as in 
need).  Indeed, the positive duty to ‘prescribe regimens for the good of my 
patients’ in the Hippocratic Oath precedes the notion of ‘doing no harm’.  Yet 
doctors’ training and special expertise places them not only under an ethical duty 
to enhance the welfare of their patients (beneficence), but also to avoid doing 
harm by treating a patient negligently. ‘Negligent’ treatment may come about 
either through doing too much – overtreatment – which results in harm; or from 
doing too little, a form of therapeutic nihilism. Inevitably, achieving the balance 
between beneficence and non-maleficence lies at the heart of medical intervention, 
since most such interventions entail some degree of risk or harm before good can 
be brought about; the key question is whether the harm done or risked is 
proportionate to the benefit anticipated.   
                                                     
16 n 12 above, at [38]. 
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This bipartite approach, of blending the avoidance of harm whilst 
simultaneously doing good, does resonate with the law’s aspirations on unfitness 
to plead, albeit that the law’s approach is a more unhappy choice between two 
potentially competing alternatives of what ‘fairness’ means.  Thus, is the law 
interested primarily in treating people fairly, a positive duty and arguably a broad 
one?  As Duff puts it, ‘a defendant should be held unfit to plead if, and only if, his 
condition is such that it precludes a fair trial’;17 and a fair trial is one that entails 
meaningful participation by the accused.  Or is the focus on fairness one more 
procedurally based, that is in ensuring that the conviction of innocent people, or 
of unsafe verdicts, is avoided; in essence, is the verdict, in Grubin’s terms, 
reliable?18  This latter approach, a procedural justice approach to fairness, 
embodies what lawyers do not want to happen.  Or in William Blackstone’s 1760s 
formulation, it is ‘better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
suffer’.19  The numbers in this balancing act with respect to conviction have varied 
over time, depending on whether a defendant or victim perspective is favoured, 
but the equation rests on notions of the potential unreliability of verdicts. 
Transposed to ‘unfitness to plead’ the equation becomes more opaque. Being 
found unfit to plead does not constitute a straightforward choice between 
conviction or acquittal (or unjust conviction and unjust acquittal), because those 
for whom a positive finding of ‘unfitness’ is made, will then be subject to the ‘trial 
of the facts’.  These proceedings, essentially civil in nature,20 determine whether 
the accused ‘did the act or made the omission charged’ and do not necessitate that 
the accused participate in any particular fashion, or even necessarily be present for 
the proceedings. A positive jury finding leads to the disposal options mentioned 
above.  A negative finding means that the accused ‘walks free’, albeit that 
identification of a highly problematic mental state may render him or her liable to 
civil admission to a psychiatric hospital. 
Is unfitness to plead founded then on achieving positive fairness or avoiding 
procedural injustice? Although the latter has historically been conceptualised as the 
primary rationale for unfitness,21 this paper argues in favour of the former, in 
essence following Duff’s (1994) argument that fitness to plead, and any trial that 
ensues, is a communicative process in which the accused answers any prosecution 
case made out and is open to the censuring process that may follow conviction.  
The convicted accused is, in Duff’s words ‘a rational and responsible agent’22 who 
will be held to account having engaged with the court as an active participant in 
                                                     
17 R. A. Duff, ‘Fitness to Plead and Fair Trials: Part 1: A Challenge’ (1994) Crim LR 419, 419. 
18 D. Grubin, ‘Fitness to Plead and Fair Trials: Part 2: A Reply’ (1994) Crim LR 423. 
19 W. Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-1769). 
20 J. Peay, ‘Civil Admission Following a Finding of Unfitness to Plead’ in B. McSherry and P. Weller (eds), 
Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).  
21 In short, avoiding wrongful convictions and the threat to the integrity of the trial process were 
uncomprehending defendants to be tried. 
22 n 17 above, 420. 
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their own trial.  If the accused is unable to participate, then he or she cannot be 
tried fairly.   
Quite how far down the Duff route one might want to go is seen by some as 
problematic.23  Understanding the normative dimensions of a trial, as opposed to 
ensuring pragmatic effective engagement with that process through proper 
communication, might be seen as going beyond what even the ECtHR has 
required.24  However, since conventional trials are followed by punishment, or a 
combination of punishment and rehabilitative efforts, engaging effectively in that 
process does entail an ability to recognise the moral (or immoral) dimensions of 
what one has done.  Those who have the capacity to understand these normative 
aspects, but reject them, are proper subjects for trial.  Those who cannot, may not 
be; and to punish those who cannot understand its rationale should make all of us 
deeply uncomfortable. 
One other argument is relevant to this broader approach to fairness. Whilst 
unfitness to plead was originally a temporary procedural provision, it has 
transformed into, for the most part, a substantive outcome.25 And the substantive 
outcome following a finding of unfitness and a determination that the individual 
did the act or made the omission charged is a disposal option that does not require 
the ‘effective participation’ of the unfit person. These disposal options are limited 
to compulsory admission to hospital, supervision and treatment orders (where the 
accused is required to submit to medical treatment – the only explicit mention of 
requiring the patient’s consent is where the supervisor wishes to give treatment at 
a place or institution not specified in the order26), or an absolute discharge.  They 
arguably and contrastingly do not require the normative understanding entailed for 
convicted defendants in what it means to be censured by conventional 
punishment.   
 
THE CONCEPT OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION 
 
In arguing for a broader approach based on fairness this paper draws heavily on 
the work of the Scottish Law Commission (‘SLC’)27 on its earlier Discussion Paper 
in 2003,28 and on the case from Jersey of Attorney General v O’Driscoll:29 all of these 
                                                     
23 For example, see Law Reform Committee of the Bar Council and the Criminal Bar Association of 
England and Wales, ‘Unfitness to Plead. A Response to the Law Commission CP 197’ (25 January 2011), 
67. 
24 See T v UK; V v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121; SC v UK (2005) 40 EHRR 10 at 29.  See also Law 
Commission, n 4 above, para 2.102. 
25 Now only those who receive disposals of an admission order with a restriction order attached have a 
right to be returned to court for a trial should their condition improve (see Sched 1, s 4(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, which permitted the Home Secretary to remit for 
trial those given admission orders with restrictions, but not those given merely admission orders: the 
admission order equates to a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983, which can be made with 
or without a restriction order attached). 
26 See Sched 2, s 4(4).  This would not be to imply that the order overrides the need for consent if medical 
treatment is given.  
27  SLC, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (SE/2004/92, no, 195, 2004). 
28  SLC, Discussion Paper, (no. 122, 2003). 
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formulate a test of unfitness in terms of effective participation.30  The concept of 
effective participation derives in part from consideration by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) of Article 6 (broadly, the right to a fair trial).  Similarly, 
the British Psychological Society, in its submission to the Bradley review, argued 
that the accused ‘must be capable of contributing to the whole process of his or 
her trial, starting with entering a plea’.31  
Thus, the Scottish Law Commission asserted, ‘the question of whether an 
accused is a fit person to be subjected to a criminal trial is not merely a procedural 
preliminary to a case proceeding but is a substantive precondition to the legitimacy 
of the whole trial process’.32   
This is important since it takes the consideration of unfitness to plead away 
from a narrow focus on the accused’s response to the indictment to embrace the 
ability of the accused properly to engage with the trial itself.  A number of issues 
arise from this and are discussed below.  Finally, it is important to note that taking 
this broad view similarly engages the issue of fitness to plead guilty, since it is only 
fair guilty pleas, ones where the accused has the requisite capacities to understand 
the normative dimensions of punishment, that could be sustained by a system that 
strives to achieve effective (ie meaningful) participation by the accused. 
But the focus on effective participation leads to its own problems; for 
example, within the case law there is some confusion as to whether a test of 
unfitness ought to include those with learning disability.  Difficulty in 
understanding the trial based on poor education or social disadvantage (or 
difficulty in acting in one’s own best interests)33 will not constitute a sufficient 
basis for unfitness.34  As the SLC advocate, what is required is some underlying 
clinically recognised condition,35 which has the effect of significantly undermining 
the accused’s capacity for effective participation.  The SLC argue that merely being 
puzzled or perplexed by the process would not be sufficient, although it does 
acknowledge that the suggestion that the legal advisor can interpret for the 
accused person is an insufficient response since pleas require an accused to ‘fully and 
meaningfully communicate with his lawyer’.36  Similarly, developmental immaturity 
over the age of 10 would not, in itself, be sufficient to make a trial unfair, where 
the accused had representation, and proper adjustments were made to the trial to 
take account of the accused’s age;37 but a clinical condition in a young defendant, 
for example post-traumatic stress disorder, might make the trial unfair.  One way 
                                                                                                                                       
29 Royal Court of Jersey (Samedi Division) (9 July 2003). 
30  Attorney General v O’Driscoll [2003] Jersey Law Review 390, had similarly drawn on the work of the 
SLC’s Discussion Paper. 
31 Lord Keith Bradley, Lord Bradley’s Review of People with Mental Health Problems or Learning Disabilities in the 
Criminal Justice System (London: Department of Health, COI, 2009), 60. 
32 n 27, s 5.55. 
33 R v Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557. 
34 See variously O’Driscoll, n 30 above, at [32]; SLC, n 27 above, s 4.16.  
35 SLC, ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 T and V v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
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of interpreting this is that effective participation can be achieved even for those 
with various forms of learning disability if appropriate support is given in court.  
Lord Bradley has recommended: ‘Immediate consideration should be given to 
extending to vulnerable defendants the provisions currently available to vulnerable 
witnesses’;38 that is, the special measures under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 to reduce the stresses associated with a court appearance so 
that individuals can give their best evidence.39  The measures are regarded as 
particularly important with regard to communication.  
Of course, all of this presupposes that the condition itself will be readily 
recognised; and even the Bradley Report accepts that identifying those with mental 
health difficulties, and learning disability in particular, is problematic.  Moreover, 
expert (medical) evidence is required to determine the precise manner in which the 
underlying condition prevents the accused from engaging with the process; and, if 
having engaged with the trial process, an accused makes a submission of unfitness 
during that process, the judge can reject this where only one medical opinion is 
submitted.40  Again, the limited purchase that medical evidence has in this context 
looks evident.   
Yet in practice the situation is somewhat different, at least in respect of 
learning disability.  Medical evidence of mental impairment underpins the 
empirical findings that mental impairment is one of the key bases for unfitness; 
indeed mental impairment is the main diagnosis in 21 per cent of cases,41 albeit 
that there are only a very limited number of unfitness findings each year.42 
 
A SHORT DIVERSION INTO HISTORY 
 
Despite this confused status, it is important to recall, as Loughnan carefully 
documents, that the use of the term “insanity” (and subsequently non compos mentis) 
was used to cover both ‘idiots and lunatics’,43 in essence everyone of unsound 
mind.  Indeed, as she observes, drawing on the work of Nigel Walker, unfitness to 
plead started its life as much as a way of dealing with the problems of those who 
                                                     
38 n 31 above, 61.  
39 Partially implemented under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amendments to the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence 1999; see Hoyano, who describes the Government’s response to Bradley in this regard 
as ‘pusillanimous’, since vulnerable adult defendants will have to demonstrate that they are unable to 
participate effectively, rather than merely having diminished capacity, as applies to child defendants and 
witnesses: L. Hoyano,  ‘Coroners and Justice Act 2009: (3) “Special Measures Directions Take Two: 
Entrenching Unequal Access to Justice”’ (2010) Crim LR 345, 358. 
40 Determinations of unfitness to plead require two or more registered medical practitioners, at least one 
of whom is approved, to give written or oral evidence.  Moreover, the Judge is entitled to refuse to 
discharge the jury where, mid-trial, and the defendant has given evidence and instructions, and the Judge 
has observed this, when faced with a letter from single psychiatrist saying the accused was unfit. R v 
Ghulam, The Times (CA, 26 October 2009).   
41 D. Grubin,  ‘Unfit to Plead in England and Wales, 1976-1988 A Survey’ (1991) 158 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 540. 
42  See the research by R. Mackay in n 4 above, Appendix C, which indicates there are currently about 100 
cases per year where unfitness is established. 
43 A. Loughnan, Mental Incapacity Defences in Criminal Law (PhD thesis, Law Department, LSE, December 
2007), 46-47. 
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could not communicate (the deaf and dumb) as with those who had 
comprehension difficulties (the mentally ill and intellectually impaired).44 
Moreover, although the ‘deaf and dumb’ could be tried if they had sufficient 
understanding, problems relating to their physical inability to communicate would 
prevent a trial if no sufficient understanding could be established for them to be 
tried fairly.  In contrast, those who refused to communicate – ‘mute by malice’ – 
could be confined and starved and, from the fifteenth century, subjected to a form 
of torture, known as pressing by stone, to make them enter a plea if they had the 
capacity to communicate.45  This procedure, albeit rare, was formally ended in 
1772, when standing mute was to be taken as pleading guilty.  Only those who 
were ‘mute by visitation of God’ were protected, and they could have a plea of not 
guilty entered on their behalf, and tried, albeit cautiously, once sufficient 
understanding was established; where ‘madness was real’, accused persons would 
be protected from trial until such time as they were fit.46  Thus, arrangements 
covered both those with physical and mental incapacities, that is, incapacities of 
either communication and / or comprehension.  But facilitating participation was 
a key objective. 
As will be noted below, and as Grubin illustrates, the distinction between 
those who did not have the capacity to be tried, and those who temporarily were 
unable to use the capacities they had, became confused in the cases of Dyson 1831 
and then Pritchard 1836, both of whom were ‘deaf and dumb’, albeit that the key 
issues concerned whether lying beyond their communication difficulties were 
difficulties of comprehension.47  The judgments reflect this focus on cognitive 
capacities (or their lack of them).  But it is true to say that both the nineteenth 
century madmen and their ‘deaf and dumb’ counterparts clearly did not have the 
requisite capacities at the requisite time.   
If it is the capacity to participate that is critical, some anomalies remain. 
Physical disorders that may affect one’s ability to participate in a trial can result in 
arrangements being made to accommodate the effects of those disorders rather 
than obviating the trial altogether.  Inability to communicate, for example, may 
arise from a stroke or coma, both of which may be alleviated with time or through 
special arrangements to facilitate communication.  Memory problems at the time 
of the trial may constitute unfitness since they may impair the accused’s proper 
appreciation of the proceedings.  Yet, curiously, amnesia for the crime is 
insufficient, since it does not prevent a defence being made48 (although it may 
                                                     
44 N. Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, Volume 1: The Historical Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1968). 
45 D. Grubin, ‘What Constitutes Fitness to Plead?’ (1993) Crim LR 748, 750. 
46  n 43 above, 47. 
47  n 45 above, 751-752. 
48  n 13 above; having no recollection, due to (hysterical) amnesia, does not make an accused eligible to be 
found unfit to plead.  Also the presumption is that the defendant is sane / fit, so the burden falls on the 
defendant to prove otherwise.  If raised by prosecution the standard to be satisfied is beyond reasonable 
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impair the ability to put forward particular defences, for example, of provocation – 
now ‘loss of control’ under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009).  
Similarly, disorders of mood and emotional difficulties can affect one’s ability 
to communicate and participate effectively, although they have not obviously 
fallen within the criteria for unfitness to plead. 
 
PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED 
 
At this point it is instructive to return to the case of Walls in order to examine why 
the views of the two psychiatrists as to his unfitness were rejected by the Court of 
Appeal.49  In formal terms, the psychiatrists were criticised for not making 
reference to the Pritchard criteria; arguably, the fault lies not with them but with 
those instructing them to prepare the reports, but without being privy to these it is 
hard to comment further.50  However, at the hearing both psychiatrists were 
subject to detailed questioning by counsel for the respondent, questioning from 
which it emerged one of the psychiatrists was not fully familiar with the details of 
Walls’ police interview.  That clinicians find themselves criticised and 
discomforted in a court setting should come as no surprise; perhaps what is more 
surprising is the court’s rejection of the substance of the psychiatric findings.  The 
courts are, of course, bound by Pritchard, but Pritchard has proved, with its focus on 
what constitutes ‘a proper defence’ (see below), malleable.  The essence of the 
psychiatric testimony was that Walls’ disability went beyond mere intellectual 
impairment to include disability and social handicap. His vulnerability to anxiety 
under stressful conditions and his impairments in relation to attention, 
concentration, and verbal skills would affect his capacity properly to instruct 
counsel, and to understand and follow evidence in court. He had significant 
cognitive defects and had difficulty in understanding causality and abstract 
concepts.  Indeed, since he could not understand the charge or the details of the 
evidence, he would not be able to instruct lawyers effectively.  Moreover, his 
anxiety might be misinterpreted by the jury as guilt.  In short, the interaction 
between his low IQ and his other disabilities would put him at a substantial 
disadvantage. 
The failure to engage with the details of Pritchard should not be a surprise.  As 
long ago as 1995 Bowden had observed that, in court, psychiatrists tend to give a 
global view on unfitness accommodating their clinical judgement within the legal 
                                                                                                                                       
doubt; if by the defence, the balance of probabilities.  The SLC, n 27 above, s 5.59, recommended that 
the civil burden should apply to both prosecution and defence. 
49  n 12 above. 
50 Notably, A. Bickle and P. Stankard, ‘Referrals for Expert Psychiatric Opinion on Dangerous 
Offenders: A Survey of Instructions Regarding Defendants Liable on Conviction to a Statutory 
Assessment of Dangerousness’ (2008) 48(3) Medicine, Science and Law 211 observe that, in a study 
concerning the instructions given to psychiatrists under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, only six per cent 
referred the psychiatrists to the relevant statutory provisions on dangerousness. 
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criteria.51  Professional discomfort with these procedures is also evidenced by 
James et al,52 who asserted that the current unclear position under Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 tends to lead to ‘pragmatic avoidance of the 
question of capacity by professionals concerned’.  
However, it is curious that the Court of Appeal in Walls made reference to 
the Sevenoaks Youth Court case,53 where the Divisional Court had found the Youth 
Court to have a duty, under both common law and procedural rules, to appoint an 
intermediary in a case where such an appointment was necessary to ensure a 
young defendant received a fair trial and could participate effectively.  The Court 
in Walls observed that no-one had raised the question of appointing such an 
intermediary.  Yet they did so without bringing into question the fairness of Walls’ 
trial, even though he had seemingly similar impairments to the defendant in the 
Sevenoaks case, namely intellectual impairment and learning disabilities which 
expert evidence said would impair his ability to concentrate, challenge evidence, 
and communicate effectively with his lawyer. 
At one level these impairments, together with a reading age of nine, might be 
regarded as commonplace amongst those finding themselves in court – they are 
certainly not uncommon when the characteristics of those imprisoned are 
examined.  And one can readily see why clinicians might conclude that such 
defendants cannot participate effectively in their own trials, even though they may 
understand the meaning of guilt in simple terms and recognise that they have been 
accused of doing something wrong.  Injustice would seem writ large.  Yet for 
lawyers working with the Pritchard criteria, and for lawyers who recognise the 
benefits of timely trials, with legal representation, justice may be seen as a more 
nuanced concept, and one that requires some final separation between those who 
should be tried and those who clearly cannot properly be exposed to judgment in 
its traditional form.  Is this an irreconcilable clash between clinicians with a rosy-
eyed view of justice and lawyers with a blinkered view of the realities of plea and 
trial?  Which profession bears the consequences of these judgments? 
The Walls case crystallises the essence of the problem in unfitness to plead.  
Determining what competencies the defendant should have in order to be 
exposed to trial, and being able to assess them reliably, needs greater clarity if 
these decisions are to be made consistently.  This is one of the justifications, 
perhaps the key justification, for the research being conducted by Blackwood et al 
under the terms of the Nuffield grant.54  But the case also exposes why the 
                                                     
51 P. Bowden ‘Criminal Proceedings’ in D. Chiswick and R. Cope (eds), Practical Forensic Psychiatry 
(London: Gaskell, 1995). 
52  D. James, G. Duffield, R. Blizard, and L. Hamilton, ‘Fitness to Plead. A Prospective Study of the 
Inter-Relationships between Expert Opinion, Legal Criteria and Specific Symptomatology’ (2001) 31 
Psychological Medicine 139, 148. 
53 n 12 above. 
54 Nuffield Foundation research grant: ‘Fitness to Plead: The Impact of Cognitive Abilities and 
Psychopathology’ by Nigel Blackwood (Kings College London), Michael Watts (University College 
London), and Jill Peay (LSE). 
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Pritchard criteria are in need of re-examination – a task on which the Law 
Commission have already embarked.  Too narrow an approach to determining 
what constitutes unfitness will mean that some defendants, who are not able to 
participate effectively in their own trials, will necessarily risk being exposed to an 
unfair process and unjust punishment. 
So we should be interested in what law means, what clinicians mean, what 
connects the two, what works, how it works, what the law ought to be, and which 
accused persons cannot be treated fairly if fairness is to be the core concept 
underlying the competency.  Does the test currently include all it ought to include; 
is the threshold set too low so that those who are not fit are tried; or is the 
threshold acceptable, but its application problematic?  And it has been argued that 
this depends not only on the nature of the accused and the test, but also the 
complexity of the case, requiring a more flexible approach by the judge.55  
Notably, and arguably in keeping with Grubin’s proposals, it is now a matter for 
the judge to determine whether the defendant is fit to plead: the matter of the 
defendant’s capacity is no longer left to a jury.  Medical evidence will still be heard, 
but it is for the judge to interpret this, not a lay jury.56 
 
 
 
THE CURRENT POSITION 
 
The law on unfitness is under review and in flux; it also varies by jurisdiction, even 
within the UK (England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland are all 
different);  Jersey and Guernsey, where there have been other developments, are 
British Crown dependencies and are not part of the UK legislative arrangements 
as such.   
 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
The essential position is set out in the 1836 case of Pritchard.57 
 
There are three points to be inquired into – first, whether the prisoner is 
mute of malice or not; secondly, whether he can plead to the indictment or 
not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the 
course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper defence – to 
know that he might challenge any of you to whom he may object – and to 
comprehend the details of the evidence, which in a case of this nature must 
constitute a minute investigation.  Upon this issue, therefore, if you think 
that there is no certain mode of communicating the details of the trial 
                                                     
55 n 45 above. 
56 Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 22(2), amending the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) 
Act 1964. 
57 n 14 above, at [304]. 
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to the prisoner, so that he can clearly understand them, and be able 
properly to make his defence to the charge; you ought to find that he is 
not of sane mind. It is not enough, that he may have a general capacity 
of communicating on ordinary matters.   
 
The gloss put on this in R v Podola58 reiterates whether the accused is of sufficient 
intellect to comprehend, that is clearly to understand, the course of proceedings so 
as to be able properly to make his defence to the charge. 
A somewhat more modern formulation can be seen in the case in of Friend:59 
 
[…] the accused will be able to comprehend the course of the proceedings so 
as to make a proper defence.  Whether he can understand and reply 
rationally to the indictment is obviously a relevant factor, but [the jury] 
must also consider whether he would be able to exercise his right to 
challenge jurors, understand the details of the evidence as it is given, 
instruct his legal advisers and give evidence himself if he so desires.  
 
Subsequently, the judge in R v M (John) directed the jury that it was sufficient for 
the defence to persuade them on the balance of probabilities that any one of six 
things was beyond the appellant's capabilities in order to establish that the 
defendant was unfit to plead. And as the Court of Appeal noted approvingly in 
refusing an appeal against that ruling, those six things were as follows:  
 
(1) understanding the charges; (2) deciding whether to plead guilty or not; (3) 
exercising his right to challenge jurors; (4) instructing solicitors and counsel; 
(5) following the course of the proceedings; (6) giving evidence in his own 
defence.60  
 
Thus, making a proper defence, included in the formulation of the Pritchard 
criteria, seemingly embraces ‘an ability to give evidence’ (to understand questions 
and give intelligible replies).  However, as the Court proceeded to explain, ‘a loss 
of memory would not necessarily render an accused unfit to plead if he was able to 
do the various things described in Pritchard’.61 And nor, as in Robertson,62 would ‘the 
mere fact that a defendant may not be capable of acting in his best interests during 
the trial’.  It also noted that ‘a jury should not be directed that the issue is whether 
he is able "properly" to instruct counsel, or to give "proper" evidence’,63  And 
finally the Court emphasised that ‘merely because a defendant was highly 
                                                     
58 n 13 above. 
59 R v Friend (1997) 2 Cr App R 231 at [240]. 
60 M (John) [2003] EWCA 3452 at [20]. 
61 ibid, at [29]-[30]. 
62 Robertson (1968) 52 Cr App R 690.  
63 M (John), n 60 above, at [30]. 
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abnormal did not mean that he was incapable of doing those things set out in 
Pritchard’.64  Thus, the Court of Appeal observed, the ‘authorities clearly establish 
the law on this topic in this jurisdiction […] They do not set the test of fitness to 
plead at too low a level’.65 
Sadly, mere recitation that something is clear does not make it so.  The 
judgments in Pritchard/Podola are repeatedly approved, and yet these specifically 
make reference to the defendant’s ability ‘properly to make his defence’.66  
Similarly, the addition of ‘giving evidence’ in the list of six above will necessarily 
entail fine judgments about whether it is in a defendant’s best interests to give 
evidence or remain silent where his or her mental disabilities may lead the jury to 
come to erroneous conclusions, and particularly where they may now be entitled 
to draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence.   
Thus, it can be argued that there has been a shift in the direction of effective 
participation and away from a mere focus on the accused’s cognitive capacities. 
Initially in the case of Pritchard it can be seen that there was no reference to 
instructing counsel.  This shift can be seen in part in the case of Davies 1853, who 
was considered too mad to be capable of properly instructing counsel; in part with 
the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act, which introduced defence counsel in felony 
cases; and in part with the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act, which permitted accused 
persons to give evidence in their own defence.  Clearly, with the widespread 
engagement of legal representation, the need for the accused themselves to enjoy 
the highest cognitive capacities is somewhat reduced, since counsel are present to 
translate and explain proceedings,67 but at the same time the need for the accused 
to be able to communicate effectively with their representative gains prominence. 
And it is not just a question of being able to give instructions, but also for those 
instructions to be understood by the representative and for any advice given to be 
understood in turn by the accused person. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL V O’DRISCOLL:68 THE JERSEY TEST 
 
Here, the court determined not to follow the Pritchard criteria, but rather to 
fashion its own future test.  Thus, unfitness was to be based on an inability to 
participate effectively in proceedings: 
 
An accused person is so insane as to be unfit to plead to the accusation, or be 
unable to understand the nature of the trial if, as a result of unsoundness of 
mind or inability to communicate, he or she lacks the capacity to participate 
effectively in the proceedings. 
                                                     
64 ibid. 
65 ibid, at [31]. 
66 nn 13 and 14 above. 
67 For example, in Stanford v UK (series A282-A).  The ECtHR held there had been no breach of Article 6 
where an accused with hearing problems had legal representation, and his representatives were aware of 
his hearing difficulties but chose not to bring them to the attention of the court. 
68 Attorney General v O’Driscoll, n 30 above. 
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In determining the issue regard shall be had to the ability of the accused: 
 
a. To understand nature proceedings so as to instruct his lawyer and to 
make a proper defence; 
b. To understand substance of evidence; 
c. To give evidence on own behalf; and 
d. To make rational decisions in relation to participation in the proceedings 
(including whether or not to plead guilty) which reflect true and informed 
choices on his part.69 
The court retained the differential balance in the standard of proof where the 
burden fell respectively on the Crown or the accused. It recognised that the fact 
that unfitness was a judge- (or Jurat) based determination in Jersey meant that the 
court could rely on an experienced body of judges to arrive at reasonable 
conclusions following evidence of clinically recognised conditions, and not mere 
puzzlement by accused persons.  But the desire of the court was evident to 
establish a test which protected the human rights and dignity of those afflicted by 
mental or physical incapacity and was consonant with the ECHR, developments in 
medical science, and appropriate to the social needs of their jurisdiction in the 21st 
century.70   
 
PROFESSOR MACKAY’S APPROACH 
 
Professor Mackay, who provided an expert opinion to the Jersey court in 
O’Driscoll, favoured a test that embodied two elements: whether the accused had 
the capacity to assist his lawyer, and whether he had decisional competence.71  The 
Jersey court’s inclusion of the need for rational decisions that reflect true and 
informed choices on the accused’s part derives from Professor Mackay’s 
recommendations.72  This test is accordingly not only a test of functional 
competence, but also of decisional competence. 
In the light of the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper below, Mackay 
refined his proposals.73  He agrees with the Commission that the Pritchard criteria 
are too narrow in focussing solely on cognitive criteria, and failing to take account 
of mental capacity and the ability to participate in a criminal trial (and some would 
also argue, failing to take proper heed of a defendant’s impaired emotional state or 
even of mental disorders such as severe depression which can lead to feelings of 
pathological guilt).  But he criticises the Commission for its proposal to replace 
                                                     
69 ibid, at [29]. 
70 ibid, at [27]. 
71 ibid, at [25]. 
72 R. Mackay, ‘On Being Insane in Jersey Part Three – The Case of Attorney-General v O’Driscoll’ (2004) 
Crim LR 291. 
73 R. Mackay, ‘Unfitness to Plead – Some Observations on the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper’ 
(2011) Crim LR 433. 
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this narrow test with a single test focussing on the accused’s decision-making 
capacity with respect to the spectrum of trial decisions he or she might be called 
upon to make.  Rather Mackay favours ‘updating the Pritchard/cognitive criteria 
and supplementing them with a “decisional competence” limb’.74  Thus there 
would be a two-stage process: identifying those who were foundationally unfit (the 
bulk of those already identified by the Pritchard criteria) would precede (and 
obviate the need for, if an accused was found ‘foundationally unfit’) any 
assessment of impaired decision-making capacity and the need for special 
measures to support them.   
Of course, given the numbers of prisoners with severe learning impairments, 
it is questionable whether the ‘foundational’ approach is working well at present, 
and it also raises the question of whether such convicted offenders ought not to 
have benefitted from special measures regardless of their decision-making abilities.  
Can these issues be so neatly divided up?  Or is it suggested that the test of 
decisional competence will sweep up all those who ought properly to be within the 
unfit category?  However, Mackay’s recommendations will no doubt receive 
careful consideration, for he has been for many years the leading researcher and 
academic in this field in this country.  
 
THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION  
 
It its 2004 Report the SLC recommended that the test for the plea of unfitness in 
bar of trial should be that:  
 
[…] as a consequence of the accused’s mental or physical condition at the 
time of trial he lacks the capacity to participate effectively in the proceedings 
against him.  The test should include a non-exhaustive list of activities which 
would indicate such lack of capacity.75 
 
A non-exhaustive list had been set out in the earlier Discussion Document;76 it 
included the ability to understand the nature of the charge, the need to tender a 
plea and its effects, to understand the purpose of a trial, to follow the course of a 
trial, to understand the substantial effect of evidence given against him, to 
communicate adequately with a legal representative, and to give adequate 
instructions to a legal representative.  
Although having the disability was a prerequisite, it is the effects of the 
disability on the potential fairness of the trial and the accused’s ability to 
participate which is critical.   
To conclude this section on legal tests it is clear that a number of such 
potential tests were in existence before the Law Commission entered the field: 
Pritchard and its supplementary successors, which do not go far enough to embrace 
                                                     
74 ibid, 445. 
75 n 27 above,  s 4.19. 
76 n 28 above, 23. 
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disorders beyond disorders of cognition to include emotional and mood disorders 
which may produce decisional incompetence; the Scottish approach, which is a 
detailed proposal with respect to the elements that make up effective participation; 
and the Jersey (and Mackay) approaches which go even further so as to embrace 
decisional incompetence, namely the failure to make capacious decisions which 
reflect true and informed choices by the accused (presumably the choices the 
accused would have made were he or she not afflicted by mental disability).  For a 
test to be ECHR compliant the SLC argued that, even for those with limited 
capacity, compliance could be achieved if this were taken into account during 
proceedings, and the accused had adequate opportunities to discuss with counsel 
and have all relevant facts and arguments submitted on his behalf.  In short, 
effective participation was the key, not necessarily full participation. 
 
THE LAW COMMISSION’S CONSULTATION PAPER ON ‘UNFITNESS TO PLEAD’   
 
In October 2010 the Law Commission issued its consultation paper on 
Unfitness.77  The period for comments closed in January 2011: it may be some 
time before a final report is forthcoming.  The Law Commission published in 
2012 a further consultation paper on Insanity;78 this entails examination of the 
special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under the M’Naghten Rules.  It is 
possible that any final recommendations on unfitness to plead and insanity will be 
published concurrently, necessarily incurring significant delay for the unfitness 
proposals. It is also notable that whilst CP 197 was warmly received in some 
quarters, its reception in others has been more mixed.79  In particular, caution has 
been expressed about the viability of a standardised psychiatric test (currently 
being researched by Blackwood, et al)80 which is regarded as central to the efficacy 
of the Commission’s proposals and represents one of their 14 provisional 
proposals.81  The Commission argue that inconsistency in the application of the 
Pritchard criteria may reflect the inadequacy of those criteria, but:  
 
[…] it is just as likely to be a reflection of the fact that there is no standard 
test for psychiatrists to use.  We think that if there was a sound psychiatric 
test for assessing decision-making capacity in criminal proceedings, this 
would lead to consistency in assessments.82  
 
                                                     
77 n 4 above.  
78 Law Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Insanity’, forthcoming.  
79 See, for example, discussion of the responses of the Bar Council and the Royal College of Psychiatrists in 
England below. 
80 n 54 above (research team: Blackwood, Watts, Peay, Brewer, and Appiah-Kusi). 
81 n 4 above, provisional proposal number seven, s 1.34. 
82 ibid, s 5.14. 
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At this stage it is too early to judge whether a viable test will emerge from the 
research,83 and in the context of mixed responses to the Commission’s proposals 
as a whole, only a brief synopsis of the Commission’s relevant draft proposals will 
be offered here. 
In essence the Commission are proposing a new legal test based on the 
decision-making capacity of the accused.  Whilst their proposals are closely aligned 
with the requirements for identification of those lacking the capacity to make 
decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, their test requires assessors to 
consider the accused’s capacity with reference to the spectrum of trial decisions 
the accused might be required to make.  Judges would need to take account both 
of the complexity of the particular proceedings and of the gravity of any likely 
outcome, but to do so in the context of the availability of special measures that 
might enable the accused to stand trial where reasonable adjustments can be made 
to trial procedures.  
The Commission also propose changes to the section 4a hearing – the trial of 
the facts – so that the prosecution would be required to establish not only that the 
accused did the act or made the omission charged, but also that there are no 
grounds for an acquittal; this will take the prosecution into the territory of 
establishing mens rea.  The difficulty this creates concerns the lacunae of those 
accused who have done the act, but for whom an acquittal results because of the 
accused’s mental disorder at the time of the offence (ie, not an absence of mens rea, 
or even an insufficient mens rea, but the wrong kind of mens rea).  Here it is 
proposed that a further hearing could take place which might then result in a 
compulsory therapeutic disposal (such a disposal being available had a positive 
finding been made in the first instance in the section 4a hearing). 
 
Royal College of Psychiatrists’ response 
 
A specific psychiatric test for capacity does not exist in civil law/the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. We would argue that rather than leaving 
psychiatrists unequipped, this allows them the freedom to tailor their 
professionalism to each individual unique case.  Mental disorders are 
diverse, individuals even more so and the psychiatric testing underpinning 
the legal capacity test will differ by condition and case.  Introducing any 
defined psychiatric test along the lines suggested would appear to run the 
risk of creating a burden of rigid and perhaps unnecessary testing.84 
 
This encapsulates well the clinical approach to unfitness, and underpins any likely 
resistance of psychiatrists to the introduction of a defined test, assuming the 
Blackwood, et al research is able to produce one tailored to the demands of 
                                                     
83 The test is still undergoing testing with a stratified ‘normal’ group, a psychotic sample, a learning 
disability sample, an autism spectrum sample, and a malingering sample.  A final report will be prepared 
for Nuffield in 2012. 
84 Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘Unfitness to Plead’ (Consultation Response, 2 February 2011), 17. 
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criminal trials.85   The College argues that such a test would be rigid and give a 
false impression of scientific validity, that it would be problematic to administer in 
prisons due to its reliance on technology, and that the problems should be 
resolved through better instructions from solicitors and reliance on a cohort of 
well-qualified experts in the field.  Whilst better instructions are, of course, to be 
welcomed, this will not overcome the problem of ensuring a consistent approach 
to the assessment of unfitness.  And it should be remembered that the Law 
Commission are not suggesting that such a test would replace a judicial 
determination of unfitness; it would just ensure that the psychiatric opinions that 
are presented in court address the defendant’s relevant capacities.  But it is evident 
that the psychiatric profession will require some persuasion before embracing any 
emergent test.  
 
The Bar Council’s response86 
The Bar Council anticipates that if the Law Commission’s proposals were 
adopted, there would be a significant increase in the number of findings of 
unfitness – an increase that will go considerably beyond even that anticipated by 
the Commission of an extra 500 cases a year.87  The Bar Council also have other 
anxieties, in particular with reference to applying a decision-making test, but these 
in turn portray a view of those seeking to employ unfitness as at best strategic and 
at worst manipulative.  Thus, worries about a defendant having the capacity to 
plead guilty, but not to plead not guilty and face trial, produced the following 
comments:  
 
Our tentative/provisional view is that such an outcome would be undesirable, 
and that a process that permitted such an outcome might be vulnerable to 
abuse by some defendants who choose to make a tactical decision to plead 
‘not guilty’ whilst playing the ‘medical card’ in the hope that, for example, (a) 
a full trial, perhaps leading to conviction, might be avoided, or (b) the 
defendant can justify not giving evidence, or (c) the defendant can avoid 
adverse inference directions.88 
 
As with the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Bar Council is sceptical as to the 
likely emergence of a reliable psychiatric tool,89 and is adamant that the ultimate 
determination of whether, or to what extent, the defendant lacks decision-making 
                                                     
85 n 54 above.  The anxieties the College expresses about the reliability and validity of such a test can only 
be addressed once a standardised instrument has been produced. 
86 n 23 above.  
87 The most recent figures suggest there are about 100 cases per year: see n 42 above.   
88 n 23 above, 13. 
89 ibid, 17. 
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capacity ought to be a judgment for the court’.90  In short, a tool can only inform 
the medical experts, and they can only give their opinions to the court.  
It is thus notable that both the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Bar 
Council have fiercely defended their traditional territories.  
 
 
 
CORE COMPETENCIES: 
WHAT MIGHT FAIRNESS MEAN TO THOSE LACKING THE 
NECESSARY CAPACITIES TO PLEAD OR STAND TRIAL? 
 
Fairness is not an easy concept as applied to the trial process: and there will be 
disparities between ideal trials and those conducted day-to-day in our trial courts.91  
Achieving a completely level playing field is unrealistic, but avoiding one that has 
unjustifiable hazards for those not properly equipped to scale them might be.   
Why might achieving fairness be more problematic for those with mental 
disabilities?  First, there is the issue of objective and subjective fairness.  What we 
are trying to achieve is a criminal justice system which is objectively fair in that it 
looks fair to outsiders, but also one which feels fair to the parties.92  Yet achieving 
‘fairness’ is problematic where people hold irrational or paranoid beliefs or are 
inspired by irrational motives: their perception of what is fair may not be in 
accordance with that of others.  And judging this from the perspective of an 
outsider is not necessarily straightforward.  Thus, and drawing on two examples 
given by Wessely, et al,93  a man who wears a green tie to protect himself against a 
(believed) threat from the IRA may look objectively unremarkable to outsiders.  
However, a woman who reports her parents to the local police because she 
believes they are demonically possessed may have acted subjectively in a 
reasonable fashion, even though our contestation of the unreasonableness of the 
underlying belief would lead us to take notice of the behaviour.  So man A may 
(inappropriately) slip past any unfitness threshold, whereas woman B, who has 
acted rationally, may get inappropriately (in her view) caught up.  The ‘effective 
                                                     
90 ibid, 21. 
91 n 17 above.  Indeed, the higher courts are not always overly sympathetic to the needs of particular 
accused.  Juries can now be instructed to draw adverse inferences where defendants do not give evidence; 
this can work against mentally disordered offenders, eg  in Hassan Tabbakh [2009] EWCA Crim 464,  it 
was argued that the defendant may not be able to do himself justice because he could not control himself 
in a witness box due to post-traumatic stress disorder.  The court held that the jury would understand and 
allow for this.  All the details were left to jury, and it was for them to decide whether or not to draw an 
adverse inference.  Weighing the importance of giving evidence against the risk of harm to the defendant 
was accordingly a matter for the defendant and his legal advisors once the decision to hold a trial had 
been reached. 
92 The need for subjective awareness, even amongst those whose levels of consciousness may be 
compromised, is supported by the recent case of R v Clarke [2009] EWCA Crim 921, discussed in  J. 
Rumbold and M Wasik, ‘Diabetic Drivers, Hypoglycaemic Unawareness, and Automatism’ (2011) Crim 
LR 863, 867. 
93 S. Wessely, A. Buchanan, A. Reed, J. Cutting, P. Garety, and P. Taylor, ‘Acting on Delusions I: 
Prevalence’ (1993) 163 British Journal of Psychiatry 69. 
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communication’ which overlays this will thus hide a multitude of problems.  It is 
also important to remember that people, both with and without disabilities, lie 
frequently about their motivations and beliefs on rational grounds, and these lies 
can, in turn, lead sometimes to unreasonable or irrational responses in others.  So 
we need a system which is objectively fair and looks / feels as fair as is possible to 
others so that it can maintain public support; and yet be one that correctly 
identifies those who should not be being tried where such a process would 
objectively entail fundamental unfairness to an accused who cannot engage 
effectively with that process. 
Second, there are the assumptions on which the criminal justice process is 
founded; for example, that defendants act strategically, act in their own best 
interests, and have the benefit of legal advice.  How much of this is true?94  
Indeed, acting in one’s own best interests is explicitly discounted with reference to 
fitness, for example in Robertson where the appellant argued that the finding that he 
was under a disability should be quashed.  The Court of Appeal agreed on the 
grounds that the jury may have been under the misapprehension that because 
Robertson’s delusional thinking may have caused him to act otherwise than in his 
best interests, that he was under a disability.95  The appellant argued that despite 
his delusions he was capable of understanding the trial process and was, broadly, 
Pritchard compliant.  Thus, he should not be deprived of his right to a fair trial just 
because he might not exercise his choices wisely.  Thus it was the process of 
decision-making, not the outcome, that mattered. 
Interestingly, much of the original hearing in Robertson concerned the Crown’s 
argument about whether he was able properly to follow and apprehend the course 
of a criminal trial, etc.  Perhaps this emphasis on properly derived from a close 
reading of the Pritchard criteria, as reiterated in Podola.96  But, the emphasis on the 
degree of understanding is interesting for two reasons: first, it is consonant with 
the medical approach which reflects degrees of disability rather than the legal 
approach which stresses a standard to be satisfied or rejected; and second, because 
it draws a distinction between the degree of understanding one might need, for 
example, to instruct counsel and the degree of capacity one might need to reach 
true and informed decisions unaffected by one’s underlying disorder, the approach 
discussed above of decisional competence.  However, the Court of Appeal in 
Robertson did not exploit such nuances and rather boldly rejected the notion that if 
one could not act in one’s own best interests, one could nonetheless be fit to 
plead.  
But, the position may be shifting, albeit fractionally. One recent case on the 
use of antisocial behaviour orders (ASBOs) is helpful, namely Cooke v DPP.97  This 
was an appeal against the imposition of an ASBO.  There was a mental health 
                                                     
94 Or will remain true under proposed changes to legal aid? 
95 n 62 above.  
96 n 14 above, at [304]. 
97 R (on the application of Jamie Cooke) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] EWHC 2703. 
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report from a community psychiatric nurse (CPN) which said that the appellant 
had mental health problems, but that he was not a danger.  The Magistrates had 
doubted the evidential basis for that report since the CPN did not seem to be 
aware of appellant’s previous convictions.  More importantly, the Magistrates said 
that he had an understanding of the order made and did not consider it inevitable 
that he would breach any requirements imposed.  On appeal the High Court 
concluded that the order should not be made if the impairment meant the appellant 
did not have the capacity to understand the order or comply with it.  This is 
consonant with Duff’s earlier argument about the importance of effective 
participation extending through to issues of censure.  In so concluding the High 
Court cited Wookey v Wookey to the effect that injunctions should not be granted 
where it was impossible for those subject to the injunction to comply with them; 
this was because they would not have the desired deterrent effect or operate on his 
mind so as to regulate his conduct.98   
The other line of reasoning in the judgment concerns the Magistrates’ 
assertion that Cooke showed both consequential thinking and reasoned choices by 
selecting rational places to beg (alleyways and near cash-points) and living in the 
town centre, having rejected other accommodation.  However, there is a problem 
with this in that it displays attributional thinking: do only the rational make 
objectively rational choices?  Thus, the relationship between outcome and process 
is not straightforward.  Sometimes an ‘irrational’ outcome may influence a 
judgment as to whether the prior process has been flawed: sometimes a seemingly 
rational outcome will cause one not to question the prior process.  The example 
usually cited to illustrate this is that one’s capacity to make decisions is much more 
likely to be questioned when one disagrees with one’s doctor than when one does 
not.   
On behalf of Cooke it was argued that the order was not necessary to protect 
the public since Cooke was incapable of complying with the order: consequently it 
was unjust and a wrong exercise of discretion to impose it if it was known that the 
order would be breached.  The High Court agreed with this proposition, but 
concluded that Cooke was not incapable of complying.  Where, for example, a 
personality disorder may result in making the subject liable to disobey the order, 
this would not constitute a sufficient reason for not making the order.  
Impulsiveness is not inevitability.  What the courts seemed to require was a form 
of causative certainty.99  But is anti-social behaviour ever likely to be convincingly 
demonstrated to be caused by or consequent to a mental health disorder? 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
98 [1991] 2 FLR 319. 
99 n 97 above, at [18]. 
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WHAT CAPACITIES ARE NEEDED TO ENGAGE IN A COMMUNICATIVE TRIAL 
PROCESS? 
 
Antony Duff has argued that the capacities required for fair trial include basic 
cognitive and intellectual capacities and a normative understanding of what it 
means to be charged and condemned.100  Therefore fit accused need both moral 
and emotional capacities, not just cognitive and intellectual ones.  Moreover, just 
because one is able to plead, in the sense of communicating, does not mean one is 
fit to plead.  Understanding what ‘to plead’ means is different from understanding 
that one might legitimately plead differently.  For example, fairness to those who 
are pathologically depressed, and who can see no point in contesting matters since 
they believe they deserve punishment, may require the ‘time-out’ from full trial 
that an unfitness process can provide, so that their responsibility for the crime can 
properly be judged at a time when they can engage (that is, they may be properly 
liable for a verdict of manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility, 
whereas their inclination, were a plea to be tendered at the earliest opportunity, 
may be to plead guilty to murder).  
Aside from those whose psychotic states may lead them to believe they have 
a viable defence (when they do not), or have no viable defence (when they may 
have), or are neglecting, for example, the advantages that may accrue from a guilty 
plea, and those whose affective states may cause them inappropriately to welcome 
punishment, perhaps the main contenders for unfitness findings are to be found, 
at least in practice, amongst the intellectually impaired.  The intellectually impaired 
will, by definition, be likely to find participating in the trial process more 
challenging than others, although it should be noted that 40 per cent of defendants 
with no diagnoses at all were found to be impaired on one or more aspects of legal 
ability as measured by the ‘Fitness Interview Test.101   
Trials are challenging events.  Getting effective participation, and hence 
achieving fairness, will require for many defendants significant assistance in court, 
and arguably assistance going beyond that offered by legal representatives.102  
Similarly, the position of young defendants (some would prefer the term ‘children’ 
were the legal age of criminal responsibility higher than it currently is at 10) poses 
further problems.  The ECtHR has already found that, even with the special 
arrangements in place, 10-year-old defendants were denied a fair trial in light of 
their youth and lack of understanding of legal process: they were regarded as 
highly unlikely to have been able to follow the proceedings properly or to pass 
information to their lawyers, which constituted a breach of Article 6.103 
                                                     
100 n 17 above. 
101 J. Viljoen, R. Roesch, and P. Zapf, ‘An Examination of the Relationship between Competency to 
Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights and Psychopathology’ (2002) 26 Law and Human 
Behavior 481. 
102 n 31 above. 
103 n 37 above. 
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As has already been noted, unfitness based on mental impairment is a main 
diagnosis in 21 per cent of cases.104  There is, of course, an argument that those 
whose intellectual impairments lead them into conflict with the law ought perhaps 
not to find themselves subject to the criminal law at all.  Andrew Ashworth has 
cogently argued that the Rule of Law requires that those who are ignorant of the 
strictures of the criminal law ought perhaps not to be subject to it, or not subject 
to its full force.105  There is, of course, a difference between ‘don’t know’ and 
‘can’t know’, but the thesis is nonetheless compelling, albeit controversial. 
Paradoxically, lawyers have been all too fond of arguing both that ignorance of the 
law is no defence and yet extol the virtues of the Rule of Law.  Even if such 
allowances were not to be made, force remains in the argument that it is unfair to 
punish those who are unaware of their own wrong-doing.  Unawareness can also 
be both factual, which is much less likely, or legal.  Moreover, the source of this 
unawareness can vary.  But where it stems from intellectual impairment, it may be 
right to argue that the courts should do more than look, as they currently do in 
unfitness findings, for an underlying clinical condition (the medical cloak of 
respectability) which underpins the intellectual impairment.  Rather it should be 
accepted that those without the intellectual wherewithal to understand a trial 
process should simply not be subject to its full rigours without some significant 
accommodations being made.  And if these are not possible, then a finding of 
unfitness may be the fairest outcome.   
Yet at present, as Mackay has frequently observed, defendants will be found 
fit with only a rudimentary understanding of trial process, and those with mood 
and delusional symptoms may be excluded altogether from the protections that an 
unfitness finding offers.106  The narrowness of Pritchard and its rigorous 
application by the courts have ensured this.  In some cases the courts have been 
open about this, as for example in Walls above; in others the support is tacit: but 
the implicit view is that it may be better to be tried ‘unfairly’ than not tried at all. 
The disposal options that follow on from a finding of unfitness (together with a 
finding that the accused did the act or made the omission charged in a trial of the 
facts) are just not sufficiently enticing. 
There is also an argument about asymmetry.  The capacities required to plead 
guilty may not necessarily mirror those required to plead not guilty (as the Bar 
Council observed above).107  The time frame for the former is more limited, albeit 
that punishment may follow more quickly.  Arguments here may turn on the 
severity of the offence and the nature of the punishment which may follow. 
                                                     
104 n 41 above; and on the position in Scotland, see E. Brewster, E. Willcox, and F. Haut, ‘Assessing 
Fitness to Plead in Scotland's Learning Disabled’ (2008) 19(4) The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 
597.  This study also notes the unfamiliarity of many psychiatrists working in the field of learning 
disability with the relevant case law in Scotland. 
105 A. Ashworth ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid It’ (Chorley Lecture, LSE, June 
2010). 
106 For an assessment of the usefulness of one of the American tests, see R. Mackay, ‘AAPL Practice 
Guideline for the Forensic Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial: An English Legal Perspective’ 
(2007) 35(4) Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 501.   
107 n 86 above. 
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Where deprivation of liberty is at stake, more capacity may be required than where 
a guilty plea may be followed by a non-custodial punishment, particularly if the 
latter has an evidently therapeutic element.  But to plead not guilty will require the 
accused to forgo any sentence discount and will entail a sustained involvement in 
the trial process, with all of its complexities. 
  
WHAT CLINICALLY MIGHT BE RELEVANT? 
 
Following their study James, et al108 concluded that the two most relevant legal 
criteria in making clinical decisions about unfitness were: could the accused follow 
legal proceedings to trial, and could they give adequate instructions to a solicitor 
including, tangentially, understanding the details of evidence.  Again, both of these 
are consonant with an approach based on fairness and the need for the accused to 
be engaged in a communicative process. 
Unfitness was significantly associated with positive psychotic 
symptomatology, and especially conceptual disorganisation and delusional thinking 
/ unusual thought content.  Delusions may need to bear on relevant issues to 
make the accused unfit, whereas arguably conceptual disorganisation will always 
impair fitness.  Symptoms of anxiety, depression, and withdrawal were less 
obviously relevant.  Thus, symptoms affecting comprehension and 
communication were the most important, at least insofar as they correlated with 
the final subjective judgments of unfitness.109   
Indeed, as Rogers, et al observe, citing the 12 potentially relevant areas of 
psychological assessment,  
 
[…] comprehension; reasoning ability; consistency; memory; concentration 
and attention; suggestibility; inappropriateness; impulsivity; insight; affect; 
passivity; and the dangers of ‘faking bad’.  It is immediately clear that the 
existing Pritchard criteria are by no means comprehensive.  It seems likely 
that many defendants both with and without a mental disorder will perform 
poorly in a number of these areas without concerns ever being raised about 
their fitness.110 
 
Indeed, in a parallel publication by the same team of clinicians looking at 
barristers’ views about the fitness provisions, the authors observe that ‘significant 
                                                     
108 n 52 above.  
109 T. Rogers, N. Blackwood, F. Farnham, G. Pickup, and M. Watts, ‘Fitness to Plead and Competence to 
Stand Trial: A Systematic Review of the Construct and Its Application’ (2008) Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 
and Psychology 576, 592. 
110  ibid, 581. 
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numbers of the mentally ill continue to undergo trial’;111 and the implication is that 
these trials are likely to be unfair. 
 
 
 
CORE COMPETENCIES: CONCLUSIONS 
 
If fairness is the preferred prevailing legal concept in unfitness to plead, which 
core competencies would one need to make fairness a reality?  Are James, et al 
correct to identify as the two core competencies: following legal proceedings to 
trial, and giving adequate instructions to a solicitor?112  And can these core 
competencies, if absent, be fully supplemented by an advisor / friend in the 
courtroom, were such an individual to be provided for vulnerable defendants, as 
recommended by the Bradley Report?113  After all, legal fairness means both trying 
those who are fit to be tried, or who can be supported to be fit, and diverting into 
the alternative ‘unfitness’ arrangements only those of uncertain culpability (not 
necessarily ‘at fault’ due to absence of agency or freedom to choose, that is people 
to whom we would attribute moral responsibility) but proven causal factual 
liability, albeit not legal liability.  
Ideally, a combination of the Commission’s decision-making test geared to 
the demands of a criminal trial, supplemented by some support provisions at trial 
which enable those who can be enabled to participate in a criminal trial (or to 
tender a guilty plea), would go a considerable way to solving the conflicting 
demands made by ‘fair trials’.  However, since identification of those who may 
face difficulties at trial is critical, the development of a sensitive screening tool to 
assess capacity for trial is undoubtedly a key prerequisite.  Setting the threshold for 
what thereafter constitutes the division between those who can be fairly tried, and 
those who should not be exposed to the likelihood of an unfair process would be 
a matter for the courts, not clinicians, to determine, in the light of their knowledge 
of the problems and possibilities that particular combinations of charges, factual 
situations, and accused persons face.  Timely, fair trials are, however, the goal.  
                                                     
111 T. Rogers, N. Blackwood, F. Farnham, G. Pickup, and M. Watts, ‘Reformulating Fitness to Plead: A 
Qualitative Study’ (2009) 20 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 815, 817. 
112  n 31 above. 
113  n 39 above, for a critical appraisal. 
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APPENDIX ON CORE COMPETENCIES 
 
Determining what competencies are core requires some understanding of the 
range and effects of the most common conditions that can afflict defendants’ 
decision-making abilities with respect to trial procedures.  Our appreciation of 
these has expanded since Pritchard, but would include:  
 
Schizophrenia 
Delusional Disorders 
Psychotic Depression and Depressive Disorders 
Bi-Polar Disorder 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorders 
Autism / Asperger’s Syndrome 
Organic Brain Disorders – Alzheimer’s, Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease,  
Deliriums, Dementias 
Learning Disability   
Personality Disorders, including Psychopathy 
 
These variously impair defendants’ autonomy to their disadvantage at trial.  The 
medication used to treat these conditions can also have a deleterious effect on a 
person’s ability to participate in their defence.  If left untreated, these conditions 
can subvert an accused’s sense of reality, leaving them with a distorted sense of 
present and past events that supplants the objective existing reality, or, in a state of 
acute confusion.  They may be incapable of concentrating, organising, or retaining 
information, and in cases of dementia are left with a jumbled mass of confused 
thoughts and short-term memory problems.  All of this impairs their judgement 
and ability to make informed choices.  There is (to varying degrees) an inability to 
understand the trial process, their role within it and their rights – and any 
corresponding sanctions.  Obtaining their informed consent is fraught with 
difficulty and may prove impossible.  The Pritchard criteria do not recognise these 
subtleties. 
Core competencies can be broken down in a number of ways.  One approach 
is to divide these into those required to participate and yet not give evidence, and 
those required specifically where a defendant enters the witness box and is subject 
to cross-examination.  For both, the ability to make decisions is implicit. 
 
1. Ability adequately to understand and participate in Court 
proceedings   
This will embody the ability to understand the nature of the 
proceedings so as to instruct his lawyer and to make a proper 
defence, and thus will comprise: 
  
Jill Peay                                        Fitness to Plead and Core Competencies 
 
 29
a. An adequate  understanding / orientation of the trial process – order 
of proceedings, roles and responsibilities, purpose and effect, 
consequences;  
b. Adequate organisational skills to assist in the preparation and 
presentation of one’s defence – provision of instructions / ability to 
respond to evidential developments pre / during trial (ie the ability to 
understand the evidence and the ramifications of the evidence); 
c. Adequate concentration, memory, and linguistic skills to follow what 
is said during a trial and respond to it; 
d. An adequate ability to recognise individual responsibility / autonomy 
in decision making, the prerequisite for informed consent, and the 
ability to make such decisions; 
e. An ability to acknowledge the formal impartiality of proceedings and 
of the professional parties, and not to be unduly affected by paranoid 
beliefs about the various parties; 
f. An adequate orientation in time and place to be able to understand the 
consequences that will stem from participating in a plea or trial at this 
point; and   
g. A reasonable ability to make decisions and sustain those decisions. 
Subsumed in this competency is the ability of the accused to understand the 
substance of the evidence, and to make decisions in relation to participation in the 
proceedings (including whether or not to plead guilty), which reflect true and 
informed choices on his / her part.114 
 
2. The ability to understand and give evidence 
This issue concerns whether an accused is able or (more relevantly) unable to give 
evidence, or if there is doubt as to a person’s soundness of mind, which would 
vitiate their capacity to give evidence; these should turn on medical evidence of 
incapacity. 
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It will comprise: 
 
a. An ability to give evidence without undue risk to health;115 
b. An inability to give evidence even given reasonable accommodations to 
the process (eg appointing an intermediary – for physical disabilities, a 
parallel example in back pain might be to allow someone to sit); 
c. An ability to give evidence without being so unreasonably affected by 
anxiety, stemming not from the usual demands of trial but from an 
underlying condition, as to prejudice a jury’s assessment of guilt; 
d. An ability to understand questions and give intelligible replies; and 
e. An ability to appreciate the distinction between what is true, what may be 
true, what are false beliefs, and what are manifest lies. 
                                                     
115 See T. Ward, ‘Hearsay, Psychiatric Evidence and the Interests of Justice’ (2009) Crim LR 415.  Ward 
notes two examples from Friend (no 1) 1997 1WLR 1433 CA (Crim Div) at [1442], where the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that the sorts of conditions that might satisfy s 35(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 would be epilepsy and latent schizophrenia where the experience of giving 
evidence might trigger an attack or florid state.  In Friend (no 2) [2004] EWCA Crim 2661, the CA added 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder where a defendant might blurt out something or give conflicting 
evidence.  Thus, a defendant in such circumstances might be fit to plead but not to give evidence under s 
35 and have adverse inferences drawn.  Ward, 419, also notes the CA’s approval in M (John), n 60 above, 
of a direction adding an ability to give evidence to the Pritchard criteria. 
